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Homosexuality and the Law: Tolerance
and Containment 11*
Arthur A. Murphy**
with
John P. Ellington***
I.

Introduction

All the conflict about family values versus gay rights that was
ignited by the 1992 campaign and election 1 will have been useful if
it leads everyone, straights and gays alike, to think more deeply
about the place of homosexuals in American society. The rhetoric
will not have been wasted if it inspires legislators, judges and public
officials to take a fresh look at whether they should be doing more or
doing less to protect society generally and its homosexual members.
The presidential and state campaigns and their aftermath have
underscored how far apart respectable people and institutions are on
the subject of homosexuality. At one extreme, newspapers like the
New York Times have continually printed articles and editorials approving homosexuality as an alternative lifestyle and urging legal
measures supportive of gays and lesbians.' At the other respectable
extreme, a substantial minority (44%) of the voters in Oregon cast
referendum ballots for an anti-gay, state constitutional amendment.
The amendment would have condemned homosexuality as "perversion", required state and local governments to discourage it and forbade any law which might treat gays as a special minority entitled to
protection from discrimination. Although the Oregon amendment
was defeated, the opinion of 44% of the voters cannot simply be
dismissed as gay-bashing or uninformed - The Philadelphia In* This article is a greatly expanded version of an essay which was written and privately
circulated by the authors.
** Professor Emeritus, The Dickinson School of Law.
*
J.D. 1993, The Dickinson School of Law.
1. See Lance Morrow, Family Values, TIME, Aug. 31, 1992, at 22. See also articles
cited infra note 35.
2. See Craig Dean, Legalize Gay Marriages, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 1991, at Op. Ed. 15;
Marvine Howe, Gay Center a Hub to Share and Care, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 1992, at B 3; The
Case for the Colorado Boycott, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 21, 1992, at A 16 (editorial); No Wavering
on Gay Soldiers, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 1993, at A 22 (editorial).
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quirer's facile explanation.$
The middle ground between polar views like those of the Oregon
minority and the New York Times deserves to be explored. There
are intermediate positions that should be articulated: positions that
come closer to accommodating the diverse views of traditionalists
and libertarians, moralists and hedonists, the political right and the
politically correct. There was one post-election development that had
the potential for innovative compromise. That was President Clinton's announced intention to allow openly gay men and lesbians to
serve in the armed forces. The president agreed with congressional
leaders that he would withhold a definitive executive order until July
1993 giving Congress, the Defense Department and himself time to
consider how the military might best accommodate homosexuals.
The compromise, which was announced on July 19th and promptly
attacked in the courts, makes only modest concessions to gay and
lesbian concerns. The proscription of all homosexual conduct is retained: conduct is defined to include not only same gender sexual and
erotic acts but also public or private statements revealing a propensity or intent to commit homosexual acts.4 (Appendix D includes a
compromise proposed by one of the authors that would have mandated greater tolerance towards homosexuals.)
One public policy approach to homosexuality that has not been
given the attention it deserves is a policy of tolerance and containment. That policy will be sketched in this article. It may turn out to
be just what is needed in a state where the majority want to do right
by their homosexual fellow citizens but are reluctant to take away
all legal constraints. Many people feel strongly that homosexuality,
if unchecked, will add to the problems of an already troubled society.
They fear that the number and influence of gay men and lesbians
might get out of hand if public policy seems to endorse their way of
life. They see full-time and part-time homosexuals and their apologists as subverting what little remains of the old moral consensus
and the institutions of marriage and family. They do not necessarily
want to return to the corsetted conformity of the 1950's but are nevertheless unhappy with the more feckless changes in mores that be3. Gay Bashing at the Polls, PHILA. INQUIRER, Nov. 7, 1992, at A 6 (editorial). See
Appendix B infra for text of the defeated Oregon Amendment.
4. See Michael Duffy, Military Obstacle Course, TIME, Feb. 8, 1993, at 27; Given Ifill,
Clinton Accepts Delay in Lifting Military Gay Ban, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 1993, at 1; Text of
Pentagon's New Policy Guidelines on Homosexuals in the Military, N.Y. TIMES, July 20,
1993, at A16; Pat Towell, Months of Hope, Anger, Anguish Produce Policy Few Admire,
CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY (Weekly Report), July 24, 1993, at 1966; David Van Biema, See
You In Court, TIME, Aug. 2, 1993, at 39.

HOMOSEXUALITY AND THE LAW

gan in the late '60's.

In this article, we approach the subject of homosexuality 5 and
the law from a public policy rather than a constitutional perspective
because we believe that the problem is essentially one of competing
values, conflicting opinions and political choice. To the extent that
the place of homosexuals in American society is determined by law,
that law should be made largely by legislatures and not by judges.
And state legislatures, not Congress, should do most of the law-making. Generally speaking, Congress ought to confine itself to legislating in the areas where only it has power: for example, legislating
about gays in the military and federal employment of homosexuals.
II.

Public Policy and Sodomy Statutes

The first thing that state legislatures ought to examine is how
their criminal codes treat voluntary sodomy, consensual oral or anal
intercourse, between persons of the same sex. 6 The most convenient
and direct way for a state to express public policy towards homosexuality, whatever that policy may be, is through its sodomy law. (We
are concerned only with consensual sodomy in this article. Involuntary sodomy is a crime and should continue to be one everywhere.)
At the present time nearly half the states retain traditional
kinds of sodomy statutes that prohibit same-gender intercourse without regard to the sexual orientation of the parties.7 Many old sodomy statutes lump "deviant" acts between man and woman and bestiality with homosexual sodomy.' These essentially different
5. We use the terms "homosexuals," "homosexuality," "gays" and "lesbians" in this
article to refer to sexually active homosexuals: we are not concerned with latent or celibate
homosexuals.
6. To keep this article short we shall say nothing about how the criminal law should
treat other forms of same-gender lewdness/lovemaking, e.g., mutual masturbation or public
erotic behavior.
7. See Developments in the Law - Sexual Orientationand the Law, 102 HARV. L. REV.
1508, 1519 & n.2 (1989) [hereinafter Developments in the Law] (identifying the code provisions of 24 states and the District of Columbia that prohibit same sex sodomy). This enumeration of states in the sodomy law camp is not quite current. In 1992, the Kentucky Supreme
Court ruled that the Kentucky statute violates its state constitution. Commonwealth v. Wasson, 1992 W L 235412 (Ky. Sept. 24, 1992). The constitutionality of the Texas sodomy statute
is before the state's high court. Mary Ann Dadisman, Gay Activists Seek Rights State by
State, 19 HUMAN RIGHTS 18 (Winter 1992). See also Mark Curriden, Sodomy Laws Challenged, A.B.A. J., July 1993, at 38.
8. See. e.g., Pennsylvania Crimes Code, section 3124, proscribing voluntary deviate sexual intercourse which is defined by section 3101 as "sexual intercourse per os or per anus (sic)
between human beings who are not husband and wife, and any form of sexual intercourse with
an animal." 18 PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. §§ 3101, 3124 (1983). On the current status of voluntary sodomy as a crime in Pennsylvania see infra note 14. An argument which relies on cultural history and public health considerations can be made that sex between women should be
dealt with separately from sex between men. See Developments in the Law, supra note 7 at
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activities should be treated separately when deciding whether they
should be criminalized. In some of these states the crime is a felony
potentially punishable by long imprisonment. 9 Traditional sodomy
laws reflect a desire to suppress homosexuality, or at least to compel
homosexuals to be discreet and remain in their closets. Although
nowadays whatever deterrent and educative effects such laws have
come mainly from their being on the books rather than from rigorous enforcement, their existence troubles the lives of active homosexuals and may tend to fuel official and private discrimination. Sodomy
laws are frequently cited by the bodies which make and administer
civil law to justify treating homosexuals adversely. Some courts, for
instance, routinely deny homosexual individuals the right to adopt
children because their way of life is inconsistent with state criminal
codes. 10
In a little more than half the states, the old sodomy statutes
have been repealed by legislatures or ruled unconstitutional by
courts. This decriminalization of sodomy occurred for the most part
during the 1970's, before the AIDS epidemnic, when advocates of
privacy, gay rights and sexual liberation made concerted attacks on
sodomy laws.11 The public policy communicated by decriminalization may range from a message of tolerance, through neutrality, to
unqualified approval of same-sex carnal acts and the homosexual
lifestyle. Some of the legislatures and courts that decriminalized sodomy did so believing that their state laws violated the United States
Constitution.12 This particular rationale was undercut by a 1986 decision of the United States Supreme Court. In Bowers v. Hardwick,
the Supreme Court declared that Georgia could apply its sodomy
statute to consensual intercourse between two homosexuals in the
privacy of the home.13 Quaere, do the state court decisions which use
their state constitutions to invalidate sodomy statutes rely on
grounds that totally preclude their legislatures from criminalizing
homosexual sodomy? At least one high court decision, Commonwealth v. Bonadio, seems to leave its legislature (Pennsylvania's)
1525, 1529.
9. See. e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2 (Harrison 1990) (voluntary sodomy is punishable
by imprisonment for not less than one nor more than 20 years).
10. On the adverse civil-law treatment of homosexuals, which is especially likely to occur in states where sodomy is a crime, see Sylvia A. Law, Homosexuality and the Social
Meaning of Gender, 1988 Wisc. L. REV. 187, 190-92 (1988).
11. See supra note 7. Decriminalization was accomplished by legislative repeal in 23
states. Developments in the Law, supra note 7 at 1536.
12. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Bonadio, 415 A.2d 47,50 (Pa. 1980) (relying on both
U.S. and Pennsylvania constitutional rights to equal protection).
13. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 195-96 (1986).

HOMOSEXUALITY AND THE LAW

free to write a new and effective statute to punish same-gender
sodomy. 1
Between the extremes of retaining a traditional statute and

decriminalizing sodomy there is a compromise approach - one that
may appeal to legislators who feel their state's current position is
either too harsh or too permissive. This approach is to enact a sodomy statute that expresses a policy of tolerance and containment.
Proposed Sodomy Statute and Its Rationale

III.

This kind of statute is meant to strike a fair and humane balance between the state's concerns and the individual's autonomy and
privacy interests. It gives due weight to competing social, moral, psychological and political considerations. The statute would say: A
person who has consensual oral or anal intercourse with someone of

the same sex is guilty of a crime (a misdemeanor, not a felony) with
one major exception. That person is not guilty if he or she and the
other party are true homosexuals or if he or she is a true homosexual
and reasonably but mistakenly believes that the partner is of similar
persuasion. A "true homosexual" is defined as an individual whose
sexual orientation is predominantly toward individuals of the same
sex.

15

A society which enacts the proposed statute announces that heterosexuality is one of its core values - a preferred moral and social
characteristic of both men and women and of the family.' 6 The ho14. Section 3124 of the Pennsylvania Crimes Code, which was struck down in Bonadio,
punished intercourse per os or per anum "between human beings who are not'husband and
wife". 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3101 (1983) (defining deviate sexual intercourse). The deviate actors in Bonadio were an unmarried man and woman. The rationale of Justice Flaherty's
lead opinion is expansive: it invalidates the statute not only because it violates the right to
equal protection by making an unjustified distinction between married and unmarried people,
but also because it exceeds the permissible limits of the Commonwealth's police powers by
regulating the private conduct of consenting adults. Bonadio, 415 A.2d at 50-52. The concurring opinion of the three justices, who with Justice Flaherty made up the majority, is Delphic
in its brevity and ambiguity. They "concur in the result" because "convinced the statute violates the constitutional rights of equal protection." Bonadio, 415 A.2d at 52. Because the deviant pair in Bonadio were of opposite sex and not married to each other, it makes sense to read
the four-line concurring opinion narrowly. It speaks only to heterosexual sodomy and does not
deny the Pennsylvania legislature power to enact a new sodomy law limited to homosexual
sodomy.
15. This definition of "true homosexual" is simple, functional and a familiar one to psychologists. See e.g. Claude Millman, Sodomy Statutes and the Eighth Amendment, 21 COL. J.
L. & Soc. PROBS. 267, n. 193 and n. 179 (1988).
16. Society's preference for heterosexuality is deeply embedded in the structures of our
culture and law. It shapes the outlook, choices and lives of millions of Americans who are not
homophobic, i.e., who do not have a pathologic or unreasoning antipathy for homosexuals. It
assumes that men and women are not in every way identical and interchangeable. See Law,
supra note 10 at 195-96. Professor Law while acknowledging this pervasive cultural phenome-
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mosexual lifestyle is not a desirable alternative for anyone who is
substantially free to avoid it. Homosexual acts should be kept within

bounds - confined to persons for whom, depending upon one's viewpoint, such conduct is natural and right, an unfortunate compulsion
or merely a tolerable evil. 17 Homosexuals are told not to seduce
straight or potentially straight individuals. The sexually uncertain,

the curious and the libertine are warned not to experiment with homosexual behavior. The bisexual is directed to make a choice. He
lives among people who are more judgmental than Alfred Kinsey or
Phil Donahue.
The proposed statute does not try to deny anyone all opportunity to express his or her sexuality. The only people whom the statute inevitably frustrates are those (rare?) bisexuals who are
powerfully, equally attracted to both men and women - the truly

"double gaited" in Damon Runyon's phrase." But as the majority of
the justices recognized in Bowers, a state may define and proscribe
deviant behavior in its pursuit of secular morality. 19 A state may
frustrate a bisexual's desire for homosexual intercourse just as it
may frustrate any adult's libidinal hankering for a fifteen year old
Lolita, a close adult relative, a prostitute or a willing animal.2 0 Arnon criticizes it and labels it "heterosexism".
17. The conception of homosexual orientation and whether it is viewed negatively, positively or neutrally has evolved in America from colonial times to the present. It has been said
that there are four major conceptions and that they came to be recognized in this sequence:
homosexuality is (i) a sin, (ii) an illness, (iii) a neutral difference (normal human variation) or
(iv) a social construct. The more recent conceptions did not displace the earlier: they all share
an uneasy existence in America today. Developments in the Law, supra note 7 at 1511-18. For
a somewhat different account of evolving concepts of homosexuality, and a critique of the
understanding of the subject displayed by the majority and dissenters in Bowers, see Anne B.
Goldstein, History, Homosexuality, and Political Values: Searchingfor the Hidden Determinants of Bowers v. Hardwick, 97 YALE L.J. 1073, 1079-91 (1988). See also Natalie Angier,
Study of Sex Orientation Doesn't Neatly Fit Mold, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 1993, at L24.
18. On the strength, persistence and origins of homosexual orientation and the more
problematic bisexual orientation/preference see C. Millman supra note 15 at 295-99; Ansastasia Touflexis, Bisexuality - What Is It?, TIME, Aug. 17, 1992, at 49; Natalie Angier, Report
Suggests Homosexuality is Linked to Genes, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 1993, at Al.
19. See notes 22 and 23, infra, and accompanying text.
20. Forty years ago, the senior author had to render an opinion on whether a soldier who
slathered his penis with hamburger and let an eager stray dog lick it off had violated the
Uniform Code of Military Justice. Someday, legislatures may be asked to outlaw or regulate
higher tech forms of self indulgence. "Teledildonics" are in the works - virtual reality, sexual
intercourse with a phantom or with a real person at the other end of a telephone line, accomplished through a computer-generated image and a bodysuit that provide electronic visual and
tactile stimulation. This apparatus has been lauded as LSD without the chemicals by the old
drug guru, Timothy Leary. Philip Elmer DeWitt, Cyberpunk!, TIME, Feb. 8, 1993, at 58, 6364. It has also been likened to LSD by a conservative writer who scathingly describes it as
coming to a West that is "morally bankrupt, materialistic and utilitarian .... [whose] popular culture is saturated with unbridled sexuality, violence and maudlin wish fulfillment. ...
[and whose] high culture is dominated by nihilism, minimalism and alienation." Gregory

HOMOSEXUALITY AND THE LAW

guably statutory rape (of a worldly young person) incest, prostitution
and bestiality laws may serve some utilitarian purpose - deter or
punish some actual or threatened harm to others - even when the
conduct is consensual. But the utilitarian purpose is often no more
compelling than the utilitarian justification for consensual sodomy

laws. The lawmaker's real reason for criminalizing the conduct is
because it has traditionally been deemed contemptible or degraded,
i.e., immoral.
The proposed statute is tailored for a state where sexual permissiveness, hedonism and the pieties of the politically correct have not
dominated the culture - for a people not ready to go along with the
many psychiatrists, psychologists, and even some religious leaders,
who believe that same-gender intercourse and the homosexual lifestyle are equivalent to heterosexual behavior in every relevant way. 1
One great lesson of Bowers v. Hardwick is that in our federal
system there is no compelling need for a uniform national policy regarding sodomy. The majority of the Supreme Court, speaking
through Justice White, refused to read into the Constitution a fundamental right to commit homosexual sodomy: that behavior had been
condemned in America for too long, and was still condemned too
widely, to be a fundamental right.2" The Georgia statute had only to
meet a rational basis test to satisfy Fourteenth Amendment due process. Justice White found a rational basis in the "presumed belief of
a majority of the electorate in Georgia that homosexual sodomy is
immoral and unacceptable. ' 23 A fortiori, a wisely calibrated sodomy
statute, like the one proposed with its thoughtful "true homosexual"
exception, should pass the rational basis test. Finally, in our opinion,
the statute does not deny anyone his or her U.S. Constitutional
rights to equal protection of the laws' and to be immune from cruel
Wolfe, Worlds Within Worlds: The Advent of Virtual Reality, 28

INTERCOLLEGIATE REV.

19,

24 (Fall, 1992).
21. Professor Sylvia Law has described the liberal bent of much contemporary psychological and religious thinking about homosexuality. Law, supra note 10 at 212-17.
22. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 191-94.
23. Id. at .196.
24. The rationale of Bowers - there is no fundamental right to commit homosexual
sodomy and majority morality is a rational basis for proscribing sodomy - seems to forestall
any successful equal protection challenge to statutes that prohibit or, like ours, regulate sodomy. Some lawyers for gay activist groups and some commentators concede that Bowers practically settles the U.S. constitutionality of sodomy laws and now advise a strategy of mounting
state constitutional law attacks on sodomy statutes. See Dadisman, supra note 7 at 18; Paula
A. Brantner, Removing Bricks from a Wall of Discrimination:State Constitutional Challenges to Sodomy Laws, 19 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 495, 497 (1992). Other commentators, who
are unwilling to accept the implications of Bowers, continue to argue that sodomy laws violate

the U.S. Constitution's guarantee of equal protection. E.g., Developments in the Law, supra
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and unusual punishment.2 5
A. More About the Philosophical and Moral Bases of the Proposed Statute

Bowers illustrates the point that in our federal, democratic republic state legislatures are given the primary governmental respon-

sibility for translating their people's morality into law. State courts
when confronted with troublesome issues of morality ought to exer-

cise restraint and try to interpret their own constitutions to require
considerable deference to the legislature's views. 6
A state legislature's task, however, is not an easy one, especially
when dealing with a controversial matter like sodomy. Legislators
whose thinking goes beyond catering to interest groups and the politics of expediency will find themselves confronted with perplexing
questions of moral and political philosophy, facts and semantics.
How are lawmakers to decide whether their constituents' or their
own opinions that sodomy is a bad thing amount to moral or ethical
beliefs rather than personal prejudices? More fundamentally, how
and by whom is morality defined: what are its nature, sources and
methodology? Should legislators simply espouse and act on what
they perceive to be the collective moral and ethical norms of a manote 7 at 1525-31. For a broader, feminist argument that all legal censure of homosexuality
violates constitutional norms of gender equality, see Law, supra note 10 at 188, 221-35 (1988).
25. Our proposed statute's treatment of homosexual sodomy as a misdemeanor, or even
a petty offense, punishable by no more than a moderate fine or relatively short imprisonment
(see infra Appendix A), addresses the reservations that Justice Powell expressed when concurring in Bowers. Justice Powell said of the Georgia statute's authorized maximum of 20 years
imprisonment, "In my view a prison sentence . . . certainly a sentence of long duration would create a serious Eighth Amendment issue." Bowers, 478 U.S. at 197. One commentator
has argued that it is cruel and unusual to punish homosexuals for engaging in private consensual acts of sodomy because the acts are elemental to their homosexual status. Claude Millman, Sodomy Statutes and the Eighth Amendment, 21 COLUM. J. L. & SOC. PROBS. 267
(1988). The argument is irrelevant to the proposed statute which makes an exception for acts
of sodomy committed by "true homosexuals." The "true homosexual" exception seems to encompass fairly what Millman means by acts "elemental to a homosexual's status." Id. at 28491. The "true homosexual" exception would likewise seem to defeat any equal protection argument that our sodomy statute discriminates against a discrete and insular minority. See
Timothy W. Reinig, Comment, Sin, Stigma & Society. A Critique of Morality and Values in
Democratic Law and Policy, 38 BUFF. L. REV. 859, 887-93 (1990).
26. Chief Justice Burger, concurring in Bowers, observed that the regulation of sodomy
is essentially a question of the legislative authority of the state and that nothing in the Constitution deprives a state of the power to enact a statute like the Georgia statute which forbids all
homosexual sodomy. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 197. When the American people are divided on an
important political or moral issue, as they are presently divided on the morality of homosexual
conduct, legislatures, not the courts, should resolve the issue. The responses of the elected
branches possess virtues and benefits - such as achieving compromise, slowing unwelcome
change and diluting absolutisms - that the "principled" and elite reactions of activist courts
may lack. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA, 8-9, 16-17, 352-55 (1990).

HOMOSEXUALITY AND THE LAW

jority of the electorate? As elected representatives how free are they
to rely on their own understanding of morality? And where does the
First Amendment come in: how do the lawmakers untangle moral
theology from the kind of secular moral beliefs (ethics) that constitutionally can be enacted into law? There are probably no comprehensive, unequivocal answers to any of these difficult questions. Legislatures and their more thoughtful members just have to cope with
them as best they can.
Legislators might go about determining whether the proposed
sodomy statute expresses, i.e., is consistent with, the moral and ethical values of a majority of the voters in many different ways. One
sensible approach is for the legislators to interpret public opinion in
the light of their own understanding of morality. The legislators
could do this by adopting the statute if they found that a majority of
the voters would favor it regardless of the voters' reasons, and if the
legislators themselves believed that the position taken by the statute
was a moral one. When evaluating the moral character of the statute, conscientious legislators would try to purge their thinking of
personal prejudice and venality. Legislators could easily find that the
position taken by the statute was moral in nature. The statute can
readily be defended using the rhetoric of morality loosely, the way it
is so often used today, to describe a "high-minded", subjective conviction that the statute prescribes "good" or forbids "evil." The statute can also be defended by more structured, objective arguments
which correspond to recognized theories of morality or ethics. For
example, a natural law type of analysis could be used to justify the
statute. The analysis might begin with the premise that God (the
non-sectarian God in whom our nation trusts) or Darwin has endowed man and woman with bodies and natures that are different
and complementary in important respects. Reasoning from this premise, and taking into account current lay and scientific knowledge
about human variation and the strength and persistence of the homosexual drive in some individuals, the argument would ultimately conclude that the proposed statute is consistent with natural law."
The statute should be immune from First Amendment attack.
The statute's condemnation of same-gender sodomy, except between
true homosexuals, has no counterpart in the plain language of any
27. For a concise description and critique of contemporary philosophical theories of morality, i.e., various forms of utilitarianism, deontology (ethics) and natural law, and of the
confused semantics of popular moral discourse see John Haas, Thinking Ethically about Technology, 28 INTERCOLLEGIATE REV. 5 (Fall 1992).
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Biblical text. The Old and New Testament passages quoted most
often by religious people decry all homosexual sodomy as sin and an
abomination. Lord knows, we were not blessed with any divine revelation: the idea for the statute came to the senior author years ago
while preparing to teach a criminal law class. To the extent that the
statute embodies the traditional Judeo-Christian religious and moral
disapproval of homosexual behavior,2" that attitude is tempered in
the statute's true homosexual exception by substantial deference to
other contemporary views about morality, privacy, individual autonomy and human sexuality. 9 In short, if a state legislature adopts our
proposed statute to express the moral and ethical beliefs of a majority of its citizens, the morality expressed is secular rather than religious and is carefully tailored for a pluralist society.3 0
B. More About the Utilitarianand Practical Bases of the Proposed Statute
The majority in Bowers v. Hardwick tell us that a state can
criminalize homosexual sodomy simply because the state finds the
conduct to be immoral. The proposed statute however can be justified on utilitarian and practical grounds as well as moral. If enacted
and enforced sensibly, the statute may help to preserve the family as
an effective institution, slow the spread of AIDS and other sexually
transmitted diseases, and promote societal unity and peace.
Prudent legislators will not insist on expert, empirical or other
proof that the statute is certain to have these beneficial effects. Common sense and common experience suggest quite strongly that the
statute will have a positive effect on marriage and the family and on
public health and harmony. The possibility of such benefits - and
the risk that without legislation the social order will sink into even
greater disarray than exists today - along with the moral basis of
our proposed statute are reasons enough to adopt the statute.
The political philosophy that underlies our utilitarian arguments
is closer to classical conservatism than classical liberalism. Our argu28. Condemnation of homosexual practices is "firmly rooted in Judeao-Christian moral
and ethical standards." Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196 (Burger, C.J., concurring). See also Elizabeth Achetemeir, Homosexuality: What Does the Bible Say?, THE PRESBYTERIAN LAYMAN,
May/June 1993, at 10.
29. Justice Blackmun expressed those other views eloquently in his Bowers dissent at
478 U.S. 199, 203-08. But see Achetemeir, supra note 28, for a succinct rebuttal to any claim
that homosexual conduct can ever be considered moral.
30. For an extensive treatment, from a pro-gay rights perspective, of the relation of
religion and morality to sodomy laws and criticism of how those matters were dealt with by
the Supreme Court in Bowers, see Reinig, supra note 25 at 866-73, 877-86, 892-93.

HOMOSEXUALITY AND THE LAW

ments are grounded in a reluctance to stray too far from the traditional wisdom which condemns sodomy between persons of the same
sex unless it can be demonstrated that a liberal, "sexual freedom"

approach causes no unjustified risks of short-term or long-term harm
to society. In any utilitarian reckoning of how to achieve the greatest

good for the greatest number, or in any other type of cost-benefit
analysis, the burden of persuasion should fall on those who would
license all consenting adults to engage in homosexual acts.31

So far as the family is concerned, no doubt children can be
happy and turn out well when raised by one or more persons in a
great variety of "family" arrangements. But is there much question
that, all other things being equal, children generally are better off
when raised in a good home environment by model mother and father figures - a loving, stable heterosexual couple? 2 With regard to
marriage, to whatever extent the statute restrains homosexual and
bisexual behavior by a spouse or prospective spouse it will eliminate
one factor that may disrupt or inhibit his or her marriage.
Today HIV/AIDS is much more prevalent among homosexual
than heterosexual men. The sexual intercourse forbidden by the proposed statute includes intercourse between gay or bisexual and
straight males and between gay and bisexual males. The spread of
HIV/AIDS will surely be slowed if this prohibition is observed.
While this is a good reason for adopting the statute, it does not justify spending large sums on enforcement. It is probably more costeffective to expend resources on educating the public and on pursuing measures precisely tailored to curb every sort of risky sexual behavior regardless of the gender or orientation of the parties. Promis31. See Anne B. Goldstein, History, Homosexuality and Political Values: Searching for
the Hidden Determinants of Bowers v. Hardwick, 97 YALE L.J. 1073 (1988). Professor Goldstein astutely observes that Bowers reflects a battle between two competing, incompatible, political philosophies, classical conservatism and classical liberalism. Justice White's majority
opinion, with its emphasis on following tradition, resembles the conservatism of Edmund Burke
and Fitz-James Stevens. While Justice Blackmun's dissent implies that an individual's right to
behave as he chooses may be limited only to prevent him from causing harm to others - a view
reminiscent of the classical liberalism of Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill. Id. at 109192. The resolution of any dispute (like the decriminalization of sodomy) that pits liberty
against tradition requires striking a balance between potential anarchy and potential tyranny.
Id. at 1099-1100. The Goldstein article includes a nice treatment of the celebrated H.L.A.
Hart-Lord Devlin dialogue on the relation of morality to the criminal law. Id. at 1093-98.
32. See Henry R. Gobbs, Bringing Up Father, TIMES, June 28, 1993, at 53, 61. But see
Daniel Galeman, Studies Find No DisadvantageIn Growing Up in a Gay Home, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 2, 1992 at C14. According to Mr. Galeman several recent studies challenge the long held
view of some mental health specialists and even more judges, that being raised by gay or
lesbian parents is damaging to a child's social, emotional and sexual development. According
to the studies, the major problem such children are likely to face is teasing or ridicule by their
peers during their early teen years.
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cuous and condomless sex in sex clubs, gay bathhouses, and bars are
examples; prostitution is another.33
Police, prosecutors and courts can administer the proposed statute without creating difficulties for the public or themselves if they
administer it the way they should: even-handedly and with only a

modest effort appropriate for a misdemeanor which (apart from possible spread of disease) does not entail immediate, tangible injury.

For the most part, police, prosecutors and courts should rely on the
occasional complainant and the witnesses he or she supplies to iden-

tify offenders and to prove their crimes rather than on aggressive
and intrusive tactics. " In the relatively few instances where the statute is invoked, the suspect will usually be able to establish the defense available to true homosexuals - if he is one - by his own
assertions. He can describe his own pattern of sexual arousal and
behavior and tell what he knew about the other fellow, or what there
was about the encounter itself, which made him believe that person
was also a true homosexual. Some homosexuals might choose to

carry a membership card in a gay or lesbian group in order to identify themselves to attractive strangers or inquisitive police. The message of the statute will retain its credibility, even if the law is seldom
invoked, as long as it is administered fairly whenever someone does
happen to be accused of sodomy.
In many states, religious fundamentalists are girding their loins
and gay activists are hitching up their designer jeans. In some states
33. During the year ending Sept. 30, 1992, 39,564 new cases of AIDS were reported
among males over the age of 13 in the United States and 6,134 among females over 13. Of the
males, 60% were "men who have sex with men". CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL, U.S. DEPT.
OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, HIV/AIDS SURVEILLANCE, 8 (Oct. 1992) Promiscuous
and unsafe sexual practices of gay men not only spread venereal diseases, e.g., gonorrhea and
syphilis, but also hepatitis and various intestinal and other illnesses. RANDY SHILTS, AND THE
BAND PLAYED ON: POLITICS, PEOPLE AND THE AIDS EPIDEMIC, 18-20 (1987). A 1991 outbreak of hepatitis A among gays has been attributed to feces ingested during tongue to anus
contacts. N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 1992, p. B2. For a description of what goes on in New York
City's commercial sex establishments and the city's efforts to regulate high risk behavior see
Mireya Navarro, In the Age of AIDS, Sex Clubs Proliferate Again, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5,

1993, at B 1. For a brief, sympathetic account of the experience of the gay community with
AIDS and the gay response see William A. Henry III, An Identity Forged in Flames, TIME,
Aug. 3, 1992, at 35.
34. Other situations where it may be appropriate to charge or convict an offender for
voluntary sodomy include (i) when a police officer comes across-an offender inflagrante while
the officer is performing unrelated police duties (this happened in Bowers) or (ii) when an
offender is tried for involuntary sodomy and the evidence fails to prove compulsion beyond a
reasonable doubt. Some AIDS experts now believe that the AIDS epidemic can be virtually
halted by concentrating prevention efforts in 25 to 30 neighborhoods across the country where
high risk groups are present and HIV/AIDS is rampant. Gina Kolata, Targeting Urged in
Attack on AIDS, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 1993, at 1.If a "neighborhood" strategy were to be
adopted, public health authorities might find it useful to have the police step up and target
enforcement of any sodomy law that is on the books.
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the battle may be waged over the presence or absence of a sodomy
statute. In even more states, the dispute will concern the civil law
treatment of homosexuals. A modus vivendi must be found if endless
warfare like that over abortion is to be averted. Our proposed sodomy statute and the general policy of tolerance and containment
which it embodies will not please everyone. But once firmly established in a state, the statute and policy may be acceptable to most
people and may even curb the more extravagant demands and outrageous behavior of gay extremists and the immoderate counter-attacks of desperate conservatives and devout gay bashers. 5
IV.

Homosexuality and Other Laws

The debate about family values versus gay rights involves many
other legal issues besides the question of whether homosexual sodomy should be a crime. Some of the civil law issues are: Should civil
rights laws or regulations treat homosexuals as a minority entitled to
special protection against physical abuse or against discrimination in
housing and employment or to special advantages like affirmative action? Should an individual's homosexuality ever be counted when he
or she wants to adopt a child or be a teacher? What should public
schools teach, with or without parental consent, about homosexuality
and in what grades?3 6 Should homosexual relationships be assimi37
lated to marriage and carry similar rights and benefits?
For most of these questions, a policy of tolerance and containment does not dictate one inevitable answer. Other relevant and possibly countervailing policies may have to be taken into account. Fur35. The following items reflect the growing scope and intensity of the conflict between
advocates of gay rights and defenders of traditional values: John Woestendick, For Gay Americans, New Visibility and New Worry, PHILA. INQUIRER, Nov. 22, 1992, at C 1; Jeffrey
Schmalz, For Gay People a Time of Triumph and Fear, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 1993, at 37;
Dirk Johnson, Rise in ChristianRight Divides a City, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 1993, at 24 (referring to Colorado Springs). The narrow issue of whether a gay and lesbian group can march
under its own banner in New York's Saint Patrick's Day parade has been the subject of tenacious politicking and litigating for the past three years. Richard Perez-Pena, Another Irish
ParadeSequel, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 1993 at B 3. For a sampling of columns by well-known
journalists that urge turning off the rancor and seeking accommodation, see Henry Grunwald,
The Conservatives Morning After, TIME, Nov. 30, 1992, at 82; George Will, Respect OK, Not
Indifference, Sentinel (Carlisle, Pa.), Dec. 7, 1992, at B3; Andrew Sullivan, Gay Values,
Truly Conservative, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 1993, at A23.
36. See Richard Lacayo, Jack and Jack and Jill and Jill, TIME, Dec. 14, 1992, at 52;
Steven Lee Myers, Queens School Board Suspended in Fight on Gay-Life Curriculum, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 2, 1992, at Al; Will supra note 35. As Mr. Will puts it, "Decency toward homosexuals is compatible with social policies regarding... curricula that avoid communicating
societal indifference or moral equivalence to children of unformed sexuality."
37. For a longer list of legal issues and discussion of them from a pro-gay rights perspective see Developments in the Law, supra note 7.
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thermore, there is an inherent tension between the idea of tolerance
and the goal of containment: the policy is more evocative than concrete. We suggest that it be interpreted to require generally that
state and local law treat homosexuals the same as everyone else: ideally, they ought to be subject to, and protected by, the same rules as
the majority of the people. Naturally, if there is a rash of skinhead
assaults on gays the police should be made to concentrate on
preventing and solving these crimes. Special laws to punish violence
are not needed when the police do their job. The containment element of the policy would militate against any change in civil laws or
any official action that is likely to increase the incidence of homosexuality and same-sex carnal behavior or which seems to endorse homosexuality as a desirable lifestyle.
Let's consider a few examples of how the policy might apply.
Marriage laws ought not to be amended or interpreted to permit issuing wedding licenses to gay or lesbian couples. Homosexual pairs
probably ought not to be allowed to adopt children as couples. Private employers who provide medical insurance to the spouses of their
employees probably should not be required by law to extend the coverage to their employees' homosexual partners. All of these things,
i.e., marriage, adoption'of children and extension of insurance coverage, presumably would entail changes in civil law norms and imply
state approval of homosexual unions. Over the long term, this kind of
state endorsement could lead to an increase in homosexual
behavior.3 8
On the other hand, a gay man or lesbian woman should not be
disqualified from individually adopting a child merely because he or
she is homosexual. In a state where true homosexuality is tolerated,
other factors will generally be more important in deciding the basic
question - what's good for the child.3 9 Of course, if a lesbian were
fiercely determined to raise an adoptive baby girl as a lesbian, no
matter what, her attitude should ordinarily preclude giving her the
38. The Hawaiian courts seem on the way to concluding that homosexuals have a right,
under the Hawaiian Constitution, to marry. See Harold J. Raske, Gay Marriage Ban Unconstitutional, A.B.A. J., July 1993, at 28. Almost as problematic as marriage is the nascent trend
among cities of establishing registries of domestic partnerships and issuing certificates similar
to marriage licenses. Homosexual couples who register are usually entitled to some or all of the
spousal rights and benefits controlled by the city. See James Bennet, Registry for Gay Couples
Holds Benefits and Risks, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 1993, at B3; Jonathan P. Hicks, A Legal
Threshold is Crossed by Gay Couples in New York, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 1993, at Al.

39. Best interests of the child should always be the touchstone; the risks to which a child
is exposed with a homosexual parent should be assessed and weighted realistically. See Developments in the Law, supra note 7 at 1644-46. See also Galeman, supra note 32 and accompa-

nying text.
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baby. But then, a court should be reluctant to allow a couple to
adopt a child if the judge believes they are so homophobic they are
likely to force the child into a straight mold whatever its, natural
inclination.
Let us consider a more difficult problem: how should a state
legislature respond to reports that private employers and landlords
are discriminating against gay men and lesbians in their employment
and housing practices?"' The problem is difficult because it first requires the legislators to find out what is going on across their state
regarding practices that are often ambiguous or hidden. Then the
legislators have to apply the rather amorphous concepts of tolerance
and containment to the facts which they find. We offer the following
observations on how a legislature might proceed:
1. The legislators should try to discover, or at least get a sense
of, the nature, scope and causes of the discrimination: What forms
does the discrimination take? How frequently does it occur and how
much hardship does it cause? Is it happening across the state or only
in particular municipalities? What motivations seem to underlie the
discrimination: to what extent are the motives rational or irrational
(e.g., homophobia, religious or moral-beliefs, business considerations,
reaction to lewd, freakish or militant deportment by the homosexuals
involved)?
2. The legislature should recognize that if it enacts any law banning discrimination, or allows any of its political subdivisions to do
40. A few states and a number of local governments have adopted laws or regulations
that prohibit, inter alia, this sort of discrimination. The New York State Assembly recently
voted to extend the state's civil rights law to bar discrimination, on the basis of sexual orientation, in employment, housing, public accommodation and credit. The bill was killed in the New
York Senate. See Developments in the Law, supra note 7 at 1582-83, 1667-68; Kevin Sack,
Passage Seen for [NY] Measure on Gay Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 1993, at BI; Kevin
Sack, Gay Rights, GOP National Issue in Albany, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 6, 1993, at 23; The Gay
Rights Debate That Wasn't, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 1993, at A12 (editorial). The conservative
and religious opponents of anti-discrimination laws had their greatest, recent triumph in Colorado in last November's election. By a 54% to 46% margin the voters approved a constitutional amendment which mandated "no protected status based on homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation". The amendment voided laws in Denver, Boulder and Aspen that
prohibited bias in jobs or housing based on sexual orientation. Gay rights supporters are attacking the amendment in the Colorado courts and pushing an economic boycott to compel
voter repeal. See Richard Corliss, Colorado's Deep Freeze, TIME, Dec. 14, 1992, at 54. See
also Appendix B infra for text of Colorado amendment. The gay rights advocates have won a
major victory in the early stages of the litigation. They got a preliminary injunction in the trial
court that was affirmed in the Colorado Supreme Court. The Supreme Court found that the
amendment probably infringes on a "fundamental" right which is protected by the U.S. Constitution's equal protection clause - the right of any independently identifiable group not to
be fenced out of the political process. Evans et al. v. Romer et al., 1993 Colo. LEXIS 628
(July 19, 1993). Whatever the eventual outcome, this case highlights the superiority in political theory of the legislative process over direct popular voting for dealing with gay rights
controversies.
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the same, it will be restricting the freedom of some of its citizens,
landlords and employers, and will be intervening in the cultural and
economic markets that help shape public beliefs about the morality
of homosexual behavior. On the other hand, the fact that prospective
or current employees and lessees are gays or lesbians, assuming they
are not indiscreet or obnoxious about their sexuality, should not affect their fitness to be employees or tenants except in unusual situations. Examples of unusual situations include a religious organization
that has a doctrinal objection to employing homosexuals and the resident owner of a tiny apartment house who does not want to share
his property with a homosexual.
3. Earlier we suggested that the policy of tolerance and containment should be interpreted to require generally that state and local
law treat homosexuals the same as everyone else and that ideally
they ought not to be protected by special rules. We here suggest that
at some point, which we will not try to pin down, the amount of
discrimination against gays and lesbians and its consequences can
become so egregious that human decency, if not constitutional equal
protection, calls for legislative relief. In effect the policy of tolerance
and containment should require not only that the state itself tolerate
homosexuality, but that it try to prevent unconscionable levels of private intolerance.
4. The state legislature should treat problems of discrimination
against homosexuals as sui generis and not analogize them to discrimination against racial, religious or other minorities. If people are
to be protected against discrimination because of their homosexual
orientation it should be done by separate legislation rather than by
amending civil rights laws. The latter course, which would lump
homosexuals with protected classes whose group behavior is not morally questionable, looks too much like official approval of the homosexual lifestyle.
5. Protection granted to true homosexuals against discrimination should not extend to bisexuals and the sexually undiscriminating.
V.

Conclusions

The proposed sodomy statute, and the policy of tolerance and
containment that it embodies, are wise choices for state legislators
who recognize the needs of their homosexual constituents yet truly
believe that homosexual behavior, if unchecked, will threaten their
society. Although we have emphasized our sodomy statute as the
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hallmark of a policy of tolerance and containment, obviously that
compromise policy can be employed in a state which chooses not to
criminalize sodomy. The legislature can still be guided by a policy of
tolerance and containment when evaluating all legislative initiatives
that relate to homosexuality.
In our federal system, the United States Constitution does not
require, and Congress should not try to mandate, a uniform national
policy with respect to homosexuality. The existence of more than one
reasonable policy response counsels against Congress extending national civil rights protection to gay men and women. So far as it
decently can and so far as the constitutional allocation of power permits, Congress should leave all the hot civil law issues to the states.
Ultimately, the status of homosexuals in America is determined
by the interaction of many factors including secular morality, religion, social and cultural influences, economics, politics, law, and the
common sense and good manners of private individuals whatever
their sexual orientation. Unfortunately, there is now so little consensus among private institutions and individuals that government must
play a large role in determining where homosexuality fits in our society. The government which plays the major role should be state government; the branch which takes the lead ideally should be the state
legislature.
APPENDIX A
This is one version of the proposed statute. Possible variations include changing the crime to a petty offense, altering the maximum
authorized punishment and, in paragraph (2), placing the burden of
disproving the defense beyond reasonable doubt upon the prosecution
once the defense is raised by the accused.

§ -

Voluntary Deviate Sexual Intercourse

(1) Any person who engages in sexual intercourse by mouth
or by anus with another person of the same sex under circumstances not covered by Section

__

of this title (relating to

involuntary deviate sexual intercourse) is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for not more than one year,
by a fine of not more than $1,000 or by both.
(2) It is a defense that the accused was a true homosexual
and the other person was also, or reasonably believed by the accused to be, a true homosexual. The accused has the burden of
proving this defense by a preponderance of the evidence.
(3) For purposes of this section, a "true homosexual"
means a person whose sexual orientation is predominantly to-
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wards persons of the same sex as himself or herself. Any relevant, admissible evidence may be considered in determining a
person's predominant sexual orientation including evidence of
patterns of sexual arousal or activity and the opinions of psychologists or other experts who have evaluated the person.
APPENDIX B
OREGON.- MEASURE NO. 9 TO AMEND CONSTITUTION
This referendum measure, which was defeated in the general
election, November 3, 1992, included the following proposed amendment to the Oregon constitution:
Be it Enacted by the People of the State of Oregon:
PARAGRAPH 1. The Constitution of the State of Oregon is
amended by creating a new section to be added to and made a
part of Article I and to read:
SECTION 41 (1) This state shall not recognize any categorical
provision such as "sexual orientation," "sexual preference," and
similar phrases that includes homosexuality, pedophilia, sadism
or masochism. Quotas, minority status, affirmative action, or
any similar concepts, shall not apply to these forms of conduct,
nor shall government promote these behaviors.
(2) State, regional and local governments and their properties
and monies shall not be used to promote, encourage, or facilitate
homosexuality, pedophilia, sadism or masochism.
(3) State, regional and local governments and their departments,
agencies and other entities, including specifically the State Department of Higher Education and the public schools, shall assist in setting a standard for Oregon's youth that recognizes homosexuality, pedophilia, sadism and masochism as abnormal,
wrong, unnatural, and perverse and that these behaviors are to
be discouraged and avoided.
(4) It shall be considered that it is the intent of the people in
enacting this section that if any part thereof is held unconstitutional, the remaining parts shall be held in force.
Secretary of State, Official 1992 General Voter's Pamphlet, p. 93.
APPENDIX C
COLORADO: INITIATIVE AMENDMENT TO CONSTITUTION
This measure, which was approved by the voters in the general
election November 3, 1992, reads:
Be it Enacted by the People of the State of Colorado:
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Article 2, of the Colorado Constitution is amended by the addition of Section 30, which shall state as follows:
NO PROTECTED STATUS BASED ON HOMOSEXUAL,
LESBIAN OR BISEXUAL ORIENTATION.
Neither the State of Colorado, through any of its branches or
departments, nor any of its agencies, political subdivisions, municipalities or school districts, shall enact, adopt or enforce any
statute, regulation, ordinance or policy whereby homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships
shall constitute or otherwise be the basis of or entitle any person
or class of persons to have or claim any minority status, quota
preferences, protected status or claim of discrimination. This
Section of the Constitution shall be in all respects self-executing.
Copy furnished to authors by Legislative Council, State Capitol,
Denver, Colorado.
APPENDIX D
The senior author sent this letter to Senator Sam Nunn and
other interested parties while the issue of gays in the military was
being studied and negotiated by congressional committees, the defense department and the president. The letter sketches a policy of
tolerance and containment that would allow known, non-celibate
homosexuals to serve in the military under substantial constraints.
May 17, 1993
Honorable Sam Nunn
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510-6050
RE: DOD POLICY REGARDING HOMOSEXUALITY

Dear Senator Nunn:
On January 27, 1993, I sent you a copy of an essay that I had
written with John Ellington entitled Homosexuality and the Law:
Tolerance and Containment. In your reply of March 5th you invited
me to submit my views about Defense Department policy regarding
homosexuality.
About my credentials - I have split the last fifty years about
evenly between the military and law school teaching.
I will skip over my experience with homosexuality in the Army my anecdotes go back a long way and could add little to the infor-

97

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

SUMMER

1993

mation you have already gathered. The two law review articles that I
am enclosing should be more useful than anecdotes. Even though
neither directly addresses the problem facing your Committee, I believe that both are very relevant. The articles supplement the observations and suggestions that I sketch in this letter. The first enclosure, Homosexuality and the Law, Tolerance and Containment II, is
an expanded, documented version of the essay I sent you last January; it will be published in the Summer issue of the Dickinson Law
Review. I wrote the second enclosed article, The Soldier's Right to a
Private Life [24 Mil. L. Rev. 97] for the Military Law Review in
1964 while still in the Army. Some of the particulars are out-of-date,
but I think that the fundamental concepts are timeless and important (see e.g., pp. 97-102, 122-24).
Getting down to business, these are my views:
1. For a great many reasons, a homosexual orientation is a
handicap in America's relatively small, all-volunteer, armed forces.
Furthermore, it is undesirable for any service member to engage in
sexual activity with someone of the same sex, regardless of whether
the member's orientation is entirely homosexual, entirely heterosexual or something in between (e.g., bisexual, undiscriminatingly hedonistic, ambivalent or confused). However, it is possible for homosexuals to manage their lifestyle and behavior (without remaining
celibate for thirty years) so that they do not adversely affect their
value to the service. Similarly, my generalization that same-sex sexual activity is undesirable needs to be qualified. The circumstances
under which the activity occurs may so negate or attenuate its connection or threat to service interests that the activity should be regarded as private, excusable or de minimis.
2. Allow me to suggest a compromise approach that I believe (i)
would make it possible for known gays and lesbians to serve, (ii)
would not appreciably degrade the quality and effectiveness of the
armed forces and might even have a net beneficial effect from the
fact that the services and homosexuals would be dealing candidly
with each other, and (iii) would not be unduly difficult to put into
place and to administer. The approach I am proposing can be characterized as a policy of tolerance and containment. It would require
some changes in the current policy of "don't ask - don't tell."
3. As I understand the current policy, one object is to make it
easier for homosexuals to enter and remain undetected in the armed
forces. The services, and their agents, do not aggressively seek out
homosexuals but if certain unequivocal indications of an individual's
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homosexual orientation come to official notice, he or she is subject to
administrative separation. The current policy involves a gamble for
both the armed forces and homosexual members: the policy is fair in
the sense that voluntary choice and mutual risk make gambling fair.
But the policy may be unfair in other ways and have undesirable
costs and consequences, to both the forces and the homosexual member. For example, in the accession process the armed forces lose
some of their ability to screen out homosexuals who are unlikely to
fit into service life. Also, prospective officers and enlistees, even when
told about the current policy, are likely not to foresee or fully appreciate the risks, dilemmas, dissembling and stress that twenty years,
or three years, of living in the closet may entail. They may misjudge
their own capacity to endure, much less thrive in, such a precarious
existence. The ultimate hard case, under current and former policy,
is one in which an otherwise exemplary soldier, who has served many
years but is not eligible to retire, is summarily discharged because
his homosexuality comes to light.
4. Under the policy of tolerance and containment that I propose
the services (i) would ask prospective officers and enlisted persons
about their sexual orientation - they would be expected to give honest answers, (ii) would screen out individuals who seem clearly incapable of complying with service requirements for managing their
lifestyle and conduct, (iii) would screen out individuals who are
clearly pathological homophobes, (iv) would allow admitted and
known homosexuals to enter and remain in the service, (v) after an
individual enters the service, would treat the member's homosexuality as a matter of very limited official concern and something the
member should keep to himself or herself and (vi) would regulate
same-sex sexual conduct, and the kind of behavior that is associated
with a homosexual lifestyle, to the very substantial extent necessary
for a first-rate American armed forces.
5. Although "known" homosexuals would be allowed to serve,
their homosexuality should be kept as private as possible. Official
information about an individual's homosexuality should be disclosed
only on a very strict "need-to-know" basis: for example, when relevant to a military or civilian criminal investigation or if the individual is a candidate for one of a few particularly sensitive assignments,
or when an individual who has had trouble managing his homosexuality is being considered for promotion. Homosexual members would
be made to understand that they must manage their homosexuality
so that it does not adversely affect their own performance of duty,
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the discipline, cohesion, esprit and effectiveness of their units, and
the morale and tranquility of other service members. If they compromise their value to the forces by engaging in forbidden or imprudent
behavior their careers will suffer or may be cut short. Homosexuals
should be told to be circumspect in choosing the people to whom
they admit their homosexuality. Gay pride has to be muted: reticence is the norm.
6. On the other hand, a gay or lesbian should not be held accountable for a problem which he or she played no culpable role in
creating. A homosexual member should not have to sacrifice selfrespect to avoid conflict provoked by someone else. For example, a
gay sailor should not have to lie about his sexual orientation, unless
he prefers to do so, to placate a bullying shipmate. The effect of the
approach that I advocate would probably be to keep most gays and
lesbians pretty much in the closet - the outcome that gay advocates
predict would follow if each individual were free to decide for himself how "open" to be about his gayness. My policy would officially,
and more surely, inhibit gays and lesbians from "coming out" in a
destructive way. It would nevertheless allow them to serve honestly,
honorably, and without anxiety, under substantial constraints that
are imposed for the good of the armed forces.
7. Some new legislation and executive orders, and quite a few
new service regulations and directives, would be needed to implement the policy of tolerance and containment that I am describing.
A manual for leaders and a handbook for homosexual service members could be very helpful. These laws, directives and manuals:
a.When read together, should constitute a candidly stated, comprehensive implementation of the policy of tolerance and containment.
(Avoid ambiguity, don't leave troublesome issues unresolved and to
be worked out later.)
b.Should treat homosexual conduct separately from heterosexual
whenever appropriate. (Recognize that the problems can be different, e.g, the "house rules" for on-post family quarters, bachelor
apartments, and guest houses probably should forbid same-sex sexual intercourse but be silent regarding unmarried, male-female
intercourse.)
c.Should make a clear distinction between rules of conduct that subject violators to punitive, administrative or other formal sanctions
and ethical norms and rules of etiquette for which there are no sanctions or only informal sanctions. (This, of course, is a drafting problem when writing any official pronouncement intended to influence
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behavior. It is likely to be extra troublesome when dealing with matters that involve morality.)
d.Should define the acts of voluntary sodomy and other lewd conduct
by a member with another person of the same sex that are criminal
because committed under circumstances likely to prejudice good order and discipline or to bring discredit upon the armed forces, e.g.,
chain of command, barracks or shipboard sex.
e.Should define and authorize punitive or administrative sanctions
for sexual harassment by, or of, a homosexual service member. (Be
careful of this one!)
f.Should forbid or discourage homosexuals from engaging in any
lewd, romantic, militant or freakish conduct or speech (i.e., behavior
that is a manifestation of a gay or lesbian lifestyle and likely to offend straight service men and women) if the conduct occurs under
circumstances likely to have an appreciable, adverse effect on the
interests of the armed forces. Particularly egregious kinds of conduct
that are likely to prejudice good order and discipline or discredit the
armed forces should be made criminal and subject to punishment.
8. With particular reference to sodomy and the UCMJ - All the
acts of voluntary sodomy that are referred to in 7d. above are aiready punishable, or could be made punishable, by armed forces regulations under the existing Articles 92, 133 or 134. Article 125, the
current sodomy statute, would need to be amended. I suggest that
Congress consider the following factors when revising 125, regardless
of how the gays-in-the-military issue is resolved.
a.Involuntary sodomy, voluntary sodomy with a person of the same
sex, voluntary sodomy with a person of opposite sex, and bestiality
ought to be dealt with separately.
b.The proscription of voluntary, opposite sex sodomy under Article
125 should probably be eliminated. Such conduct would then be
punishable only in certain specified circumstances under Articles 92,
133 or 134 (compare para. 7d, above).
c.The two best ways in which Article 125 could treat voluntary
same-sex sodomy are either to
(1)Eliminate it as a crime, thus permitting same-sex sodomy to be
punished only under Articles 92, 133 or 134.
or
(2)Retain it as a universal proscription (i.e., applicable everywhere,
at all times) by adding a section to Article 125 comparable to the
voluntary, same-sex sodomy statute that I describe in my enclosed
Dickinson Law Review piece. In essence, the amendment to Article
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125 would generally make it a crime for a person subject to military
law to engage in voluntary same-sex sodomy. It would be a defense,
however, if an accused member proved that he or she was a true
homosexual and that the other person was either a true homosexual,
or reasonably believed by the accused to be one. The rationale for
this kind of sodomy article would be that it is consistent with the
traditional and current moral values of military personnel, and furthers the pragmatic interests of the forces (e.g., promoting discipline,
the service's image and AIDS control) while being fair to those
members whose homosexual conduct may be regarded, depending
upon one's viewpoint, to be natural and right for them or to be an
unfortunate but tolerable shortcoming.
9. With the exceptions described above, homosexuals should be
governed by the same rules and entitled to the same protection, benefits and treatment as their straight counterparts - no more and no
less. They should be treated like, and made to feel like, part of one
team. Disobedience and disrespect to gay or lesbian superiors as well
as violence, harassment or gross incivility towards any service member because he or she is homosexual should be punished or corrected
as appropriate. The services should not provide separate clubs or
other separate facilities for gays and lesbians; nor should the services
provide on-post housing and other benefits to the partner of a gay or
lesbian service member. In my curbstone opinion, the fear that the
armed forces will have to provide quarters, PX privileges and other
on-post benefits to a gay member's mate if the marriage is valid
under state law, is unfounded. Congress could constitutionally exempt the armed forces from providing those benefits that would be
harmful to good order and discipline. In short, the armed forces
should not go beyond tolerance and should do nothing special that
might encourage, or be construed to endorse, homosexuality as an
alternative way of life for military personnel.
10. I believe that the kind of tolerance and containment policy
sketched above is really no more complex and has no more inherent
difficulties than the current policy of "don't ask - don't tell." Actually the two have a lot in common: current policy could be labeled a
policy of "tacit tolerance and containment," while my policy could
be described as "don't ask much - don't flaunt." Much of the action
required for implementing my policy would have to be taken to implement the cryptic "don't ask - don't tell" approach (.e.g., drafting
comprehensive laws, regulations and guidance like those described in
paras. 7 and 8 above). The special advantages of my suggested pol-
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icy - both for the armed forces and for the gay or lesbian individual
who wants to serve our country - are advantages that come from the
policy's emphasis on candor and fairness.
11. I can envisage variants of my particular policy of tolerance
and containment: my policy could be blended in some fashion with
the current compromise. For example, a policy of "don't ask - don't
tell" could apply to the accession process and the first three years of
a homosexual's service. After that period (during which the member
could, in effect, demonstrate the ability to manage conduct and lifestyle), a policy of tolerance and containment would apply. The member would not be subject to a discharge merely because he or she
disclosed homosexuality to officials or it came to official attention.
Although I could say a lot more, my letter is already too long
Best wishes for the success of your Committee in dealing with
this critical issue.
Sincerely yours,
Arthur A. Murphy
Professor Emeritus
LTC U.S. Army (retired)
Encls.
cc: President of the United States
Chairman, House Armed Services Committee
Secretary of Defense
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
TJAG, U.S. Army
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